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Is it Beneficial to be Included in a Sustainability Stock Index? 
A Panel Data Study for European Firms 
 
Abstract 
This paper empirically examines the effect of the inclusion in one of the most prominent sus-
tainability stock indexes, namely the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI World), on 
corporate financial performance. On the basis of panel data for European firms that were in-
cluded in the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index over time, our micro-econometric analysis confirms 
the relevance of unobserved firm heterogeneity since the validity of restricted pooled regres-
sion models is statistically rejected in favor of random or fixed effects models. As a conse-
quence, the strong positive impacts of the inclusion in the DJSI World on return on assets and 
Tobin’s Q in pooled regression models become weaker and less robust in the case of return on 
assets and even insignificant for Tobin’s Q in the flexible panel data models that include un-
observed firm heterogeneity. Therefore, we conclude that the application of misspecified 
panel data approaches, similar to cross-sectional models, can lead to biased parameter esti-
mates and thus to premature conclusions with respect to the impact of corporate sustainability 
performance on financial performance. Our estimation results can be explained by the high 
number of confounding financial effects of corporate environmental or social activities. An-
other explanation for the predominant weak or neutral impacts of the inclusion in the DJSI 
World could be the composition of this stock index, which is influenced by factors that need 
not necessarily be directly connected to corporate environmental or social activities. 
JEL-Classification: M14, Q01, Q56, C23 
Keywords: Sustainability stock index, Corporate environmental and social activities, Corpo-
rate financial performance, Panel data models   2 
1 Introduction 
Knowledge about the relationship between corporate environmental or social performance 
and financial success generally contributes to the debate about whether managers systemati-
cally miss profit opportunities if they decide against the protection of the natural environment 
(e.g., King and Lenox, 2002) or against the compliance with social and ethical norms. Studies 
on this relationship are also interesting for investors. The question in this respect is whether 
socially responsible investing (SRI), also called ethical or sustainable investing (e.g., Renne-
boog et al., 2008), which refers to the practice of choosing stocks on the basis of environ-
mental, social, and ethical screens, is rewarded or penalized by the stock markets. SRI assets 
have experienced a strong growth around the world, for example, 1200% between 1995 and 
2005 in the USA. This growth has led to a current share of about 10% SRI assets in total as-
sets under management in the USA and a share of over 10% in European funds. 
Against this background, some portfolio analyses compare the risk-adjusted stock returns of 
socially responsible and conventional mutual funds (e.g., Bauer et al., 2005, 2007). Since the 
financial performance of existing funds is influenced by fund management decisions that can-
not be separated from the SRI impact, other portfolio analyses focus on specific corporate 
sustainability performance assessments, such as from Innovest (e.g., Derwall et al., 2005) or 
KLD Research & Analytics (e.g., Kempf and Osthoff, 2007). Some of these assessments are 
the basis for widely considered sustainability stock indexes, such as the Domini 400 Social 
Index, which is constructed with the ratings from KLD. Another strand of economic SRI stud-
ies directly examines the financial performance of sustainability stock indexes (e.g., Sauer, 
1997, Bauer et al., 2005, Schröder, 2007), which are the basis for several socially responsible 
funds. By examining one of the most prominent sustainability stock indexes, namely the Dow 
Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI World), which claims to comprise the world-wide   3 
leaders in terms of corporate sustainability (i.e. environmental and social) performance, we 
contribute to this empirical literature in this paper. 
However, we do not focus on the investor perspective, i.e. we do not analyze the stock returns 
of portfolios that are constructed on the basis of the inclusion in this specific sustainability 
stock index. Instead, this paper captures a firm-specific perspective. Similar to McWilliams 
and Siegel (2000) and Becchetti et al. (2008), we econometrically analyze the effect of the 
inclusion in a sustainability stock index on corporate financial performance (i.e. return on 
assets and Tobin’s Q) on the basis of firm-level data. According to conventional perception, it 
is expected that firms are only incorporated in sustainability stock indexes if they are more 
environmentally or socially active than their competitors. Against this background, our analy-
sis contributes to micro-econometric studies, which examine whether it pays to be “green” or 
“responsible” in other ways (e.g., Hart and Ahuja, 1996, King and Lenox, 2001, Ziegler et al., 
2007). In this respect, it should be mentioned that corporate environmental and social per-
formance is not yet standardized, so that many different measures with a certain amount of 
subjectivity are considered. Furthermore, the selection process through the rating and finan-
cial service institutions that are responsible for the composition of these stock indexes could 
also play a role (e.g., Ziegler and Schröder, 2009).  
In contrast to many other cross-sectional micro-econometric studies on the effect of corporate 
environmental or social activities on financial performance, but in line with, for example, the 
studies of King and Lenox (2001, 2002) and Telle (2006), we use flexible panel data models 
in order to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Therefore, we can avoid biased estima-
tion results due to potential model misspecifications and especially examine whether the esti-
mation results in pooled panel data regression models are robust when unobserved firm het-
erogeneity is incorporated. Furthermore, this study refers to the entire European stock market 
and therefore considers firms of a region that has not been extensively analyzed so far since   4 
most micro-econometric studies instead examine US firms (e.g., Dowell et al., 2000, Guenster 
et al., 2006). Moreover, the few studies with a European focus only consider single countries, 
such as the United Kingdom (UK) (e.g., Elsayed and Paton, 2005) or Norway (e.g., Telle, 
2006). Finally, we consider a specific sustainability stock index, namely the DJSI World, 
which is indeed popular in the SRI discussion, but has (to our knowledge) not been micro-
econometrically examined so far with respect to the analysis whether it pays to be included in 
this index. In contrast, both McWilliams and Siegel (2000) and Becchetti et al. (2008) refer to 
the inclusion of US firms in the Domini 400 Social Index. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical basis for the empiri-
cal analysis and reviews the corresponding literature. Section 3 gives an overview of our 
methodological approach. The data and variables in the micro-econometric analysis are de-
scribed in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results of our empirical analysis and section 6 
concludes. 
2 Background 
2.1 Theoretical Basis 
This paper empirically analyzes the impact of the inclusion in the DJSI World on corporate 
financial performance. Such sustainability stock indexes are commonly considered an appro-
priate indicator for corporate environmental and social activities, corporate sustainability per-
formance, or “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, 
Heal, 2005). However, current theory concerning the effect of corporate environmental and 
social activities on economic or financial success is quite ambiguous (e.g., Waddock and 
Graves, 1997, Guenster et al., 2006). For example, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) show 
within a model with two firms that produce identical products, where one firm adds an addi-
tional CSR attribute or feature to the product, which is valued by the market, that in equilib-  5 
rium the overall effect of this attribute is neutral (see also McWilliams et al., 2006). Similarly, 
MacKey et al. (2007) use a theoretical decision making model comprising the supply and de-
mand for corporate sustainability performance, which shows that environmental or social ac-
tivities have in some cases no impact on the market value. 
Arguments for a negative impact of corporate sustainability performance can be based on 
neoclassical micro-economics. According to this, it is mainly emphasized that the operating 
costs of corporate environmental (e.g., Telle, 2006) or social activities outweigh their finan-
cial benefits (e.g., due to cost reductions through energy savings or waste reduction), so that 
the underlying principle of shareholder wealth maximization is hurt. It is argued that CSR 
demands significant portions of corporate financial resources, although the benefits are often 
in a distant future if they were to occur. As a consequence, corporate sustainability perform-
ance can lead to reduced profits, decreased firm values, or competitive disadvantages, so that 
already Friedman (1970) argues that there is no role for CSR. This neoclassical argumentation 
is supported by corporate governance theory (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Tirole, 2006) 
by emphasizing that only if corporate governance structures (e.g., optimal incentive or control 
structures) are properly installed, management will find and choose the profit-maximizing 
path. Therefore, it can be argued that, for example, the consideration of goals of other groups, 
such as the general public, as motivation for corporate environmental and social activities 
enlarges the latitude of management, which is misused for maximizing the utility of manag-
ers, so that the risk of counterproductive activities with respect to competitiveness increases. 
In contrast, investors in purely profit-maximizing firms with a lower intensity of CSR can 
expect a higher financial performance.  
However, a positive impact of corporate sustainability performance on financial performance 
can also be based on neoclassical micro-economics by emphasizing the role of respective ac-
tivities in reducing the extent of externalized costs. Friedman (1970) assumes in his criticism   6 
on CSR that the government defines property rights, so that no external effects exist. In this 
view, corporate environmental and social activities that benefit shareholders are pure profit-
maximization, while activities not benefiting investors are theft from shareholders. In con-
trast, Heal (2005) argues that the government does not fully resolve all problems with external 
effects and that the competitive markets are not efficient. Therefore, corporate environmental 
and social activities can substitute missing markets (and thus missing regulations) if external 
costs arise from them and can reduce conflicts between firms and stakeholder groups, such as 
the government, the general public, non-governmental organizations, competitors, employees, 
or clients. As a consequence, it can be argued that the reduction of these conflicts increases 
corporate profits or financial performance, at least in the long term. 
This stakeholder argument is strengthened in the strategic management literature (e.g., Wad-
dock and Graves, 1997, Barnett and Salomon, 2006, Curran and Moran, 2007). Stakeholder 
theory suggests that management has to satisfy several groups who have some interest or 
“stake” in a firm and can influence its outcome (e.g., McWilliams et al., 2006). Regarding 
corporate financial performance, it can therefore be beneficial to engage in environmental and 
social activities because otherwise these stakeholders could withdraw the support for the firm. 
For example, the avoidance of child labor in the full value-added chain of the products can 
reduce incalculable risk due to, for example, aggressive campaigns of non-governmental or-
ganizations. These arguments can be embedded in the resource-based view of the firm (e.g., 
Barney, 1991), which suggests that competitive advantages evolve from internal capabilities 
that are valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate or substitute (e.g., Russo and Fouts, 1997, Klas-
sen and Whybark, 1999, King and Lenox, 2001, McWilliams et al., 2006). In this respect, 
stakeholder management can be considered an important organizational capability or re-
source. New technologies that are installed due to proactive corporate environmental activities 
are a further example for a tangible or physical resource if these technologies can be capital-
ized and not easily imitated by competitors.   7 
The previous arguments exclusively refer to actual corporate environmental and social activi-
ties, which indeed produce costs, but could also be an important organizational resource and 
reduce conflicts with stakeholder groups. While negative news, for example, with respect to 
child labor or environmental pollution can relatively easily be observed and evaluated, it is 
much more difficult to identify proactive environmental or social activities. One example for 
a signal to stakeholders that a firm carries out environmental activities is the certification of 
environmental management systems according to ISO 14001 (e.g., Cañón-de-Francia and 
Garcés-Ayerbe, 2009). Another signal for corporate sustainability performance is the inclu-
sion in a sustainability stock index. Reputation gains through this positive signal can, for ex-
ample, attract customers who are sensitive to such issues, which could lead to higher sales. 
Furthermore, firms with a good reputation can increase its employee retention rate and addi-
tionally attract highly skilled and thus more productive employees. Regarding the embedding 
in the resource-based view of the firm, a good reputation is a further example for an intangible 
resource that is valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate or substitute. Against this background, it 
could be hypothesized that this reputation gain mechanism implies that the effect of the inclu-
sion in the DJSI World on corporate financial performance is more positive than the effect of 
corporate sustainability performance that is only insufficiently communicated to correspond-
ing stakeholders.  
However, the prerequisite for this argumentation is that the inclusion in a sustainability stock 
index, such as the DJSI World, is a reliable signal for a higher intensity of environmental and 
social activities. In this respect, Koellner et al. (2007) show that the differences between so-
cially responsible and conventional funds, which are both managed on the basis of the MSCI 
World Index, indeed are present in terms of environmental impacts, but relatively small com-
pared with possible investor’s expectations. Ziegler and Schröder (2009) further analyze the 
determinants of the inclusion in the DJSI World and show that factors that need not necessar-
ily be directly connected to corporate environmental or social activities matter as well. As a   8 
consequence, the reliability of the inclusion in the DJSI World as an indicator for higher cor-
porate sustainability performance can be questioned, so that strong reputation gains are also 
ambiguous. Regarding the proactivity of specific corporate environmental activities, Cañón-
de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009) argue that ISO 14001 certification could be interpreted 
as a pure symbolic action. In other words, corporate activities for this certification need not 
necessarily be voluntarily conducted under flexible conditions, but could also represent a 
compulsory response to market pressure. This argumentation can also be transferred to the 
inclusion in sustainability stock indexes. In this case, corresponding environmental and social 
activities may lead to additional unexpected costs, which are not directly productive, so that 
weaker positive or even negative impacts on financial success are possible. Due to this theo-
retical ambiguity, we conclude that the impact of the inclusion in the DJSI World on corpo-
rate financial performance is ultimately an empirical question. 
2.2 Empirical Literature Review 
The financial performance of sustainability stock indexes has already been analyzed by esti-
mating their risk-adjusted returns (e.g., Sauer, 1997, Bauer et al., 2005, Schröder, 2007). This 
is methodologically in line with several corresponding portfolio analyses, which consider so-
cially responsible and conventional mutual funds or portfolios that focus on specific corporate 
sustainability performance assessments (e.g., Derwall et al., 2005, Bauer et al., 2005, 2007, 
Kempf and Osthoff, 2007), as discussed above. In contrast, micro-econometric analyses that 
examine the effects of the inclusion in a sustainability stock index are rare. One example is 
the study of Curran and Moran (2007) who examine British firms and their inclusion in and 
exclusion from the specific FTSE4Good UK 50 Index. By using the event study methodol-
ogy, i.e. by considering the mean stock returns for corporations experiencing a specific event 
(new information), they report no significant impact. This event study approach is methodol-
ogically in line with the study of Cañón-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009), who examine   9 
the certification according to ISO 14001, and with a growing number of CSR related event 
studies (e.g., Hamilton, 1995, Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996, Konar and Cohen, 1997, 
McWilliams and Siegel, 1997, Posnikoff, 1997, Khanna et al., 1998, Dasgupta et al., 2001, 
2006, Gupta and Goldar, 2005). The corresponding events often refer to positive or negative 
news about specific components of CSR, such as information about toxic emissions or the 
disinvestment of corporations from South Africa during the apartheid regime. However, some 
weaknesses of such event studies are that they generally depend on unexpected events, that 
they only analyze short-run effects, and that they are limited to the analysis of stock perform-
ance as indicator for financial success. 
Indeed, it could also be possible that the inclusion in sustainability stock indexes has a long-
term effect on different measures of corporate financial performance. To our knowledge, the 
only micro-econometric analyses in this respect can be found in McWilliams and Siegel 
(2000) and Becchetti et al. (2008). They both examine the effect of the inclusion of US firms 
in the Domini 400 Social Index, which is an ethical stock index with a focus on firm assess-
ments regarding gambling, tobacco, and alcohol. While McWilliams and Siegel (2000) do not 
find a significant impact, Becchetti et al. (2008) report positive effects on total sales per em-
ployee, but negative effects on returns on equity. It should be noted that Becchetti et al. 
(2008) use fixed effects models in order to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity in their 
panel data analysis, which is in contrast to McWilliams and Siegel (2000), who use panel data 
as well and emphasize the importance of a correct model specification to circumvent omitted 
variable biases, but do not apply flexible panel data approaches (i.e. they consider average 
annual values for both corporate financial performance and the inclusion in the Domini 400 
Social Index). The application of flexible panel data models that include unobserved firm het-
erogeneity in Becchetti et al. (2008) is in line with the studies of Dowell et al. (2000), King 
and Lenox (2001, 2002), Elsayed and Payton (2005), and Telle (2006).   10
In contrast to some micro-econometric studies (e.g., Filbeck and Gorman, 2004, Ziegler et al., 
2007) using stock returns as an indicator for corporate financial performance, McWilliams 
and Siegel (2000) and Becchetti et al. (2008) apply accounting data based indicators (Bec-
chetti et al., 2008, additionally analyze conditional stock return volatility). This is in line with 
most other studies examining the impact of corporate environmental or social activities on, for 
example, Tobin’s Q, return on assets, return on sales, or return on equity (e.g., Hart and 
Ahuja, 1996, Waddock and Graves, 1997, Russo and Fouts, 1997, Dowell et al., 2000, Konar 
and Cohen, 2001, King and Lenox, 2001, 2002, Salama, 2005, Elsayed and Paton, 2005, 
Telle, 2006, Guenster et al., 2006). Many of these studies, however, only use one-dimensional 
and rather narrow CSR indicators, such as emissions of pollutants (e.g., Hart and Ahuja, 1996, 
Konar and Cohen, 2001, King and Lenox 2001, 2002, Telle, 2006). Other micro-econometric 
analyses use more general indicators that only refer to the environmental dimension (e.g., 
Russo and Fouts, 1997, Dowell et al., 2000, Filbeck and Gorman, 2004, Salama, 2005, El-
sayed and Paton, 2005, Guenster et al., 2006). Studies that incorporate both corporate envi-
ronmental and social activities (e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997, Ziegler et al., 2007), besides 
the studies on the Domini 400 Social Index as discussed above, are exceptions in this respect.  
3 Methodological Approach 
Similar to Dowell et al. (2000), King and Lenox (2001, 2002), Elsayed and Payton (2005), 
Telle (2006), and Becchetti et al. (2008), we consider panel data models for our micro-
econometric analysis. While cross-sectional econometric models are still dominant so far, 
which is also due to limited data in the time dimension, it should be noted that unobserved 
firm heterogeneity and dynamic effects cannot be modeled in such approaches, so that biased 
parameter estimates due to omitted variables are at least possible. Our starting point is the 
following panel data model for firm i in year t (i = 1,…,N; t = 1,…,T): 
     (1) CFPit = α + β DJSIit + γ’ Xit + δ’ Zit + εit   11
While CFPit denotes corporate financial performance, DJSIit is a dummy variable that takes 
the value one if firm i is included in the DJSI World in year t. Furthermore, the vector Xit 
comprises several economic variables, as discussed below, which are potentially related to 
corporate financial performance. The vector Zit comprises some time, country, and sector 
dummy variables. Finally, εit is the error term and α, β, and the components in the vectors γ 
and δ are the unknown parameters to be estimated. 
Model approach (1) implies that corporate financial performance in year t is related to the 
inclusion in the DJSI World and to other economic variables (such as capital intensity) in the 
same year t. However, such approaches do not allow any conclusion about the causality of the 
relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables and in particular between cor-
porate financial performance and the inclusion in the DJSI World since it can also be hy-
pothesized that financial success positively affects the inclusion in sustainability stock in-
dexes. Since reliable instruments are not available, we regress in the second step corporate 
financial performance on the inclusion in the DJSI World lagged by one year (i = 1,…,N; t = 
2,…,T): 
     (2) CFPit = α + β DJSIi,t-1 + γ’ Xit + δ’ Zit + εit 
In order to test the robustness of our estimation results, we additionally consider panel data 
models with additional one-year time lags for all explanatory economic variables (i = 1,…,N; 
t = 2,…,T):  
     (3) CFPit = α + β DJSIi,t-1 + γ’ Xi,t-1 + δ’ Zit + εit 
If it is assumed that the εit are independent and identically distributed for all i and t with ex-
pectation zero and variance var(εit) = σε
2, we arrive at pooled regression models that can be 
straightforwardly estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Such approaches are similar to 
cross-sectional models and therefore could lead to spurious correlations due to unobserved 
firm characteristics. For example, specific management activities or business strategies may   12
affect both the inclusion in the DJSI World and financial performance. Thus, micro-
econometric studies that do not address these endogeneity problems can lead to biased pa-
rameter estimates. Therefore, we also apply panel data models including unobserved firm 
heterogeneity besides lagged explanatory variables as in the model approaches (2) and (3). 
Unobserved heterogeneity νi for firm i can be incorporated in (1), (2), and (3) when the error 
term εit is divided into two parts uit and νi: 
     (4) CFPit = α + β DJSIit + γ’ Xit + δ’ Zit + νi + uit 
     (5) CFPit = α + β DJSIi,t-1 + γ’ Xit + δ’ Zit + νi + uit 
     (6) CFPit = α + β DJSIi,t-1 + γ’ Xi,t-1 + δ’ Zit + νi + uit 
In these model approaches, the expectation of uit is zero, var(uit) = σu
2, and the covariances 
cov(uit,ujs) = 0 for i ≠ j or t ≠ s (i, j = 1,…,N; t, s = 1,…,T). If νi is a group specific random 
variable with expectation zero, var(νi) = σν
2, cov(νi,νj) = 0 for i ≠ j, cov(νi,uit) = 0, and νi un-
correlated with all explanatory variables, we arrive at different random effects models, which 
we will term as (4’), (5’), and (6’) in the following. These models can be estimated by feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS). If in contrast νi is a group specific constant term that does 
not vary over time and can be correlated with the explanatory variables, we arrive at different 
fixed effects models, which we will term as (4’’), (5’’), and (6’’) in the following. The corre-
sponding within-transformed models can be estimated by OLS as well, similar to the case of 
the pooled regression models. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that dynamic effects could also matter. Corresponding dy-
namic panel data models (e.g., Bond, 2002) that include lagged dependent variables, i.e. in 
our case CFPi,t-1, as explanatory variables can, for example, be estimated by Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) according to Arellano and Bond (1991). We have also experi-
mented with this approach. However, the estimation results are rather inconsistent, which is 
obviously a consequence of our relatively short observation period due to the restricted avail-  13
ability of corresponding data. Dynamic panel data models obviously only work reliably for a 
larger time dimension, so that we do not report the corresponding estimation results. Further-
more, it should be mentioned that the estimation results of Elsayed and Paton (2005) suggest 
that allowing for unobserved firm heterogeneity is much more important with respect to cor-
rect conclusions than allowing for dynamic effects. 
4 Data and Variables 
Our dependent variable refers to corporate financial performance. Similar to, for example, 
Waddock and Graves (1997), we first consider return on assets, multiplied by 100 
(“ROA*100”). Return on assets as an accounting-based measure is defined as the ratio be-
tween operating income and total assets, where operating income is equal to the after-tax 
profit plus net financial expenses. Thus, return on assets measures the profitability of a corpo-
ration after tax and interest. In line with, for example, Guenster et al. (2006), we alternatively 
consider the effect of the inclusion in the DJSI World on Tobin’s Q (“Tobin’s Q”). Tobin’s Q 
is defined as the sum of market value and total debt divided by total assets. Besides the raw 
measure of Tobin’s Q, we additionally consider the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q (“log 
Tobin’s Q”) in order to analyze the robustness of the estimation results, which is in line with 
the suggestion by Hirsch and Seaks (1993). While return on assets and Tobin’s Q are similar 
in several aspects, they also have some differences. For example, return on assets is based on 
contemporaneous incomes, whereas Tobin’s Q is rather a forward-looking measure.  
Our main explanatory variable is the dummy (“DJSI World”) for the inclusion in the DJSI 
World. Together with Dow Jones Indexes and Stoxx Limited, the SAM (Sustainable Asset 
Management) Group has launched a family of sustainability stock indexes to track the finan-
cial performance of corporations that are sector leaders in terms of sustainability performance 
(including environmental, social, and also economic criteria). All these sustainability stock 
indexes are based on corresponding assessments from SAM. The DJSI World intends to com-  14
prise the world-wide leaders, i.e. the 10% most sustainable corporations of each sector of the 
biggest 2500 corporations in the Dow Jones World Index (DJ World Index). While our micro-
econometric analysis refers to European corporations, we do not examine the Dow Jones 
Stoxx Sustainability Index (DJSI Stoxx), which intends to include the 20% most sustainable 
European corporations of each sector in the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index (DJ Stoxx 600 Index) 
(e.g., Ziegler and Schröder, 2009). The reason for this is that the DJSI Stoxx was first pub-
lished in 2001, i.e. two years after the DJSI World, so that its analysis would strongly restrict 
our time dimension in the panel data. 
We include several economic variables that can possibly affect corporate financial perform-
ance. The most common variable in corresponding micro-econometric analyses is firm size 
(e.g., Orlitzky, 2001) and is therefore also used in the studies of McWilliams and Siegel 
(2000) and Becchetti et al. (2008). As an indicator for firm size we include total assets (in 
millions Euro), which is, for example, in line with Waddock and Graves (1997). In this re-
spect, the natural logarithm of total assets (“log total assets”) is used to analyze a non-linear 
effect (e.g., King and Lenox, 2001, 2002, Salama, 2005, Elsayed and Paton, 2005). The sec-
ond economic variable is leverage, measured by the ratio between total debt and total assets 
(e.g., Elsayed and Paton, 2005, Guenster et al., 2006). This variable (“debt/assets”) can also 
be interpreted as an indicator of financing conditions of a corporation. Similar to, for example, 
Russo and Fouts (1997), Konar and Cohen (2001) and King and Lenox (2001, 2002) we fur-
ther include the growth of sales as explanatory variable. We consider the annual growth rate 
(in decimals) of net sales (i.e. gross sales minus returns, discounts, and allowances) of one 
year compared with the net sales in the previous year (“sales growth”). This variable can be 
interpreted as a measure for growth dynamics of a corporation. A final explanatory economic 
variable is capital intensity (“capital intensity”). In line with King and Lenox (2001, 2002), 
we consider the ratio between capital expenditures and net sales. This variable can be consid-
ered a raw surrogate for research and development measures, which are obviously a relevant   15
factor for corporate financial performance (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). We do not 
include raw research and development measures due to the restricted availability of corre-
sponding data, so that a corresponding analysis with a distinctly smaller number of firms 
could strongly distort the estimation results. 
Finally, time, country, and sector dummies are included as control variables to capture time, 
country, and sector specific effects on corporate financial performance. Regarding the time 
effects, it should be noted that data are available for the years between 1999 and 2003. 
Against this background, we incorporate the corresponding dummy variables “2003”, “2002”, 
“2001”, and “2000” into the model approaches (1), (4’), and (4’’) and therefore consider the 
dummy for the year 1999 as omitted category. In the case of lagged explanatory variables in 
(2), (3), (5’), (6’), (5’’), and (6’’) we include “2003”, “2002”, “2001” and thus leave “2000” 
as omitted category. Regarding potential regional or political effects in different countries, we 
include the corresponding corporation specific dummy variables for Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK and 
thus treat the dummy variables for Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Norway, from 
which the number of analyzed firms is only between two and five, as joint omitted category. 
These dummy variables take the value one if a corporation has its headquarters in the respec-
tive country. It should be mentioned that the inclusion of all 15 country dummies (considering 
one omitted dummy variable) has led to qualitatively nearly identical estimation results for the 
main explanatory variables (these estimation results are not reported for brevity). The firm 
specific sector dummy variables refer to the different main industries according to the Indus-
try Classification Benchmark (ICB) of Dow Jones Indexes and FTSE (http://www.icbench-
mark.com), namely oil & gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, health care, con-
sumer service, telecommunications, utilities, financials, and as omitted category the technol-
ogy sector. It should be noted that the sector and country dummies cannot be included in the 
fixed effects model since they are constant over time. Furthermore, the estimation results for   16
these dummy variables in the pooled regression and random effects models are not presented 
for brevity (but are available upon request).  
The population for our empirical analysis refers to the European corporations that were con-
tinuously included in the DJ Stoxx 600 Index between 1999 and 2003. In other words, we 
consider a balanced panel. In the case of the panel data models with unlagged explanatory 
variables, we can therefore examine a total of N = 266 corporations in the DJ Stoxx 600 Index 
and thus 1330 observations, for which we have all relevant financial data (that stem from 
Bloomberg) over the entire observation periods. In the case of the models with lagged ex-
planatory variables, the number of observations for the N = 266 corporations reduces to 1064 
for the time period from 2000 to 2003. We do not analyze an unbalanced panel for two rea-
sons: First, such panel data would comprise firms that are only temporarily included in the 
underlying DJ Stoxx 600 Index due to their market value, which could lead to biased estima-
tion results. Second, the additional inclusion of firms for only one or two periods could also 
distort the identification of unobserved firm heterogeneity over time. 
5 Empirical Results 
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations as well as the minimums, medians, and 
maximums for the dependent and main explanatory variables in the micro-econometric analy-
sis. According to this, for example, the inclusion in the DJSI World on average amounts to 
about 32% for the 266 corporations over the five years between 1999 and 2003. Table 2 and 
Table 3 report the mutual (Pearson) correlation coefficients for these variables, respectively. 
While Table 2 comprises the relationships between the dependent and unlagged explanatory 
variables for the time period from 1999 to 2003, Table 3 refers to the correlations between the 
dependent and lagged explanatory variables for the time period from 2000 to 2003. Both ta-
bles report the expected high positive correlation coefficients between the three indicators of 
corporate financial performance, namely “ROA*100”, “Tobin’s Q”, and “log Tobin’s Q”.   17
Furthermore, the high negative correlation coefficients between firm size and corporate finan-
cial performance are worth mentioning. However, the main result in these tables is the very 
weak and even negative relationship between the inclusion in the DJSI World and the three 
corporate financial performance variables. Moreover, the relationships between the explana-
tory variables are mostly very weak as well, so that multicollinearity problems should not 
distort the estimation results. The highest correlation coefficients refer to the relationship be-
tween firm size and the inclusion in the DJSI World, but are still moderate with values of 0.26 
and 0.25. 
Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 report the estimation results of our micro-econometric analysis 
with different panel data models. While Table 4 refers to the findings for “ROA*100” as de-
pendent variable, Table 5 and Table 6 refer to the raw measure and the natural logarithm of 
Tobin’s Q as alternative indicators for corporate financial performance. All tables comprise 
the estimation results in the pooled regression models as well as the results in the random and 
fixed effects models, which include unobserved firm heterogeneity, respectively. Further-
more, all three tables report the findings in three different approaches for each panel data 
model, as discussed above. In other words, the model approaches (1), (4’), and (4’’) refer to 
the inclusion of unlagged explanatory variables. In contrast, (2), (5’), and (5’’) comprise the 
inclusion in the DJSI World lagged by one year as explanatory variable and the model ap-
proaches (3), (6’), and (6’’) additionally comprise one-year time lags for all explanatory eco-
nomic variables. According to the corresponding F tests in the pooled regression and fixed 
effects models as well as the Wald tests (being χ
2 tests) in the random effects models, the null 
hypotheses that all parameters are jointly zero can be rejected without exception at all com-
mon significance levels. 
If we only consider the restrictive pooled regression models, the estimation results for our 
main explanatory variable are obviously clear. According to Table 4 and Table 6, the inclu-  18
sion in the DJSI World is strongly positively related with return on assets and the natural 
logarithm of Tobin’s Q at the 1% significance level, irrespective of the incorporation of 
unlagged or lagged explanatory variables. While Table 5 reports that this relationship is 
slightly weaker in the case of “Tobin’s Q”, it remains significant at least at the 10% signifi-
cance level. Furthermore, capital intensity and (in line with the univariate correlation coeffi-
cients according to Table 2 and Table 3) particularly firm size are negatively related with cor-
porate financial performance in all pooled regression models, mostly at the 1% significance 
level. Finally, the correlations between “debt/assets” and “log Tobin’s Q” are strongly posi-
tive at the 1% significance level and the lagged growth of net sales has a significantly positive 
impact on both versions of Tobin’s Q in these restricted panel data models. 
However, some of these estimation results strongly change in the flexible panel data models 
that include unobserved firm heterogeneity. For example, the negative relationship between 
capital intensity and return on assets indeed remains significant in the random effects models 
(4’) and (5’), but becomes insignificant in the random effects model (6’) and in all fixed ef-
fects models. Furthermore, the correlations between capital intensity and both versions of 
Tobin’s Q become insignificant in all random and fixed effects models. According to this, the 
inclusion of unobserved firm heterogeneity is obviously important with respect to the reliabil-
ity of the estimation results. This conclusion is strongly confirmed by the results of the corre-
sponding diagnostic tests. While Breusch-Pagan tests (being χ
2 tests) with respect to the ran-
dom effects models can check the null hypothesis that no random effects are existent (i.e. that 
σν
2 = 0), corresponding F tests with respect to fixed effects models are able to check the null 
hypothesis that no fixed effects are existent (i.e. that all νi = 0). Against this background, the 
reported test statistics imply that in each case the underlying null hypothesis that unobserved 
firm heterogeneity is not existent and thus the validity of pooled regression models is rejected 
at all common significance levels.   19
This finding is particularly relevant for our main explanatory variable, namely the inclusion in 
the DJSI World. In contrast to the estimation results in the pooled regression models, its posi-
tive relationship with return on assets becomes distinctly weaker and in some cases even in-
significant in the flexible panel data models that include unobserved firm heterogeneity. This 
shifting of the estimation results is even stronger if “Tobin’s Q” or “log Tobin’s Q” are the 
dependent variables. Irrespective of the application of random or fixed effects models, the 
correlation with “DJSI World” becomes completely insignificant compared with the estima-
tion results in the pooled regression models. This finding also holds true in the respective 
panel data models (5’), (5’’), (6’), and (6’’) with lagged “DJSI World”. Against this back-
ground, neither the discussed stakeholder arguments nor the hypothesis that the reputation 
gains through the inclusion in a sustainability stock index are beneficial can be confirmed. On 
the other hand, more pessimistic views on the negative impact of necessary environmental 
and social activities for the inclusion in sustainability stock indexes, which can lead to addi-
tional unexpected costs being not directly productive, cannot be supported, either. In contrast, 
our estimation results imply a neutral effect of the inclusion in the DJSI World. 
While these estimation results hold true for both the random and fixed effects models, the 
general superiority of one of these two flexible panel data models that include unobserved 
firm heterogeneity is ambiguous. This superiority can be checked by respective Hausman tests 
(being χ
2 tests), which test the random effects model versus the fixed effects model. The null 
hypothesis is the orthogonality of the random effects and the explanatory variables. Under this 
hypothesis, the parameter estimates in the random and fixed effects models should not differ 
systematically, so that the Hausman test is based on their difference. A high value of the re-
spective test statistic thus implies the rejection of the null hypothesis, i.e. the random effects 
model, in favor of the validity of the fixed effects model. However, the test results are am-
biguous according to Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6, i.e. the null hypothesis is in some cases 
rejected and in other cases not. Table 6 also reports one negative test statistic in the model   20
approach (4’), so that no conclusion can be drawn in this case. For our preferred model ap-
proaches (6’) and (6’’), which allow the interpretation of causal effects of the inclusion in the 
DJSI World and the economic variables, the Hausman test suggests the use of the fixed ef-
fects model for the explanation of “ROA*100” (see Table 4) or “log Tobin’s Q” (see Table 6) 
and the use of the random effects model for the explanation of “Tobin’s Q” (see Table 5).  
6 Conclusions 
This paper empirically analyzes the effect of the inclusion in a sustainability stock index on 
corporate financial performance. In this respect, we examine the prominent DJSI World, 
which claims to comprise the world-wide leading corporations in terms of environmental and 
social performance. In contrast to many former studies, we consider a European perspective 
and therefore examine firms that were continuously included in the DJ Stoxx 600 Index be-
tween 1999 and 2003. On the basis of the corresponding firm-level data, we apply different 
restricted and flexible panel data models, which are able to control for unobserved firm het-
erogeneity. Our micro-econometric analysis with pooled regression models implies strong 
positive impacts of the inclusion in the DJSI World on both return on assets and Tobin’s Q. 
However, these estimation results are obviously distorted since the validity of these restricted 
panel data models is statistically rejected in favor of random or fixed effects models. In these 
flexible panel data models, the positive impacts of the inclusion in the DJSI World on return 
on assets are distinctly weaker and less robust as well as even insignificant in the case of 
Tobin’s Q. Against this background, we conclude that the estimation results in misspecified 
restricted panel data or cross-sectional models in former studies could be biased as well. 
The rather neutral effect of the inclusion in the DJSI World on corporate financial perform-
ance can be explained by several mutual confounding factors. For example, corporate envi-
ronmental and social activities in general can, on the one hand, reduce conflicts with stake-
holder groups or increase the firm reputation, which could lead to higher sales or attract   21
highly skilled and thus more productive employees. The reputation gains can further be 
strengthened by the inclusion in a sustainability stock index as a positive signal for a higher 
corporate sustainability performance. This would imply positive consequences for financial 
success. On the other hand, however, proactive corporate environmental and social activities 
that are necessary for the inclusion in the DJSI World could also be a compulsory response to 
market pressure and thus lead to additional unexpected costs, which are not directly produc-
tive, and therefore to negative consequences for corporate financial performance.  
While these arguments implicitly assume that the inclusion in the DJSI World (similar to 
other sustainability stock indexes) is an appropriate indicator for corporate sustainability per-
formance, it should be noted that the assessment and selection process for the composition of 
sustainability stock indexes is not yet standardized. As a consequence, factors that need not 
necessarily be directly connected to corporate environmental or social activities could also 
play a role. In this respect, Ziegler and Schröder (2009) show that the selection process by 
SAM, i.e. the rating and financial service institution that is responsible for the composition of 
the DJSI World, has a strong influence. According to this, a relatively high number of firms in 
the DJ World Index is never assessed at all, so that these corporations cannot be included in 
the DJSI World, irrespective of their environmental or social activities. This lowers the qual-
ity of the inclusion in the DJSI World as reliable indicator for environmental and social activi-
ties, so that both potential positive and negative effects of corporate sustainability perform-
ance on financial performance can be weakened. 
In future studies, it would certainly be interesting to empirically disentangle the interrelation-
ship between corporate environmental and social activities, the inclusion in sustainability 
stock indexes, and corporate financial performance if appropriate firm-level data are avail-
able. In order to test the robustness of our estimation results, another possible direction of 
further research would be the analysis of alternative sustainability stock indexes for the Euro-  22
pean or other non-US stock markets. While this paper considers return on assets and Tobin’s 
Q as indicators for corporate financial performance, an analysis of stock performance would 
also be interesting, for example, by applying the event study methodology with respect to new 
information about the inclusion in or exclusion from the DJSI World or alternative sustain-
ability stock indexes. In this respect, not only the common short-term event study approaches 
(e.g., Curran and Moran, 2007), but especially long-term event studies could be additionally 
applied, as they were developed and applied in financial economics (e.g., Barber and Lyon, 
1997, Kothari and Warner, 1997, Lyon et al., 1999). 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, N = 266 corporations, time dimension refers to the period be-
tween 1999 and 2003 (1330 observations)  
Variable Mean  Std.  deviation  Minimum  Median  Maximum 
ROA*100  6.79 6.70  -23.14  5.82  60.16 
Tobin’s Q  1.29 1.55 0.04 0.90  17.96 
Log Tobin’s Q  -0.09 0.80 -3.25 -0.11 2.89 
DJSI World  0.32  0.47  0 0 1 
Log total assets  23.53  1.64  18.80 23.21 27.57 
Debt/assets  0.29 0.16  0  0.29 1.42 
Net sales growth  0.10 0.41 -0.86 0.05  10.86 
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Table 2: Mutual correlation coefficients between dependent and unlagged explanatory vari-
ables, N = 266 corporations, 1330 observations, time dimension refers to the period between 
1999 and 2003  
 











ROA*100  1        
Tobin’s Q  0.70  1             
Log 
Tobin’s Q  0.73 0.77  1           
DJSI 
World  -0.05 -0.06 -0.05  1         
Log total 
assets  -0.57 -0.42 -0.60 0.26  1       
Debt/assets -0.10  -0.09  0.08  0.01  0.14  1     
Net sales 
growth  0.07 0.06 0.03  -0.08  0.00 -0.02  1   
Capital 
intensity  -0.05 -0.03 0.01  0.00 -0.06 0.12  0.01  1 
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Table 3: Mutual correlation coefficients between dependent and lagged explanatory vari-
ables, N = 266 corporations, 1064 observations, time dimension refers to the period between 
2000 and 2003 
 











ROA*100  1        
Tobin’s Q  0.69  1             
Log 
Tobin’s Q  0.72 0.78  1           
DJSI 
World  -0.04 -0.05 -0.04  1         
Log total 
assets  -0.56 -0.45 -0.61 0.25  1       
Debt/assets -0.08  -0.08  0.09  0.01  0.13  1     
Net sales 
growth  0.03 0.08 0.11  -0.10  -0.02 0.01  1   
Capital 
intensity  -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.12  0.02  1 
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Table 4: Parameter estimates (z statistics) in different panel data models, dependent variable: 
ROA*100, N = 266 corporations 
  Pooled regression models  Random effects (RE) models  Fixed effects (FE) models 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4’)  (5’)  (6’)  (4’’)  (5’’)  (6’’) 
DJSI World 
1.07
***      
(3.69) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.41      
(1.44) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.21      
(0.69) 
--          
(--) 



























Log total assets  
-2.17
***     
(-12.88) 
-2.04
***   
(-11.38) 
--          
(--) 
-2.51
***      
(-11.84) 
-1.90
***        
(-8.39) 
--          
(--) 
-4.11
***      
(-9.63) 
-1.83
***    
(-3.21) 
--          
(--) 
Log total assets 
(lagged) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-2.10
***        
(-10.92) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-1.80
***        
(-8.26) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 




            
(0.43) 
-0.22
           
(-0.13) 
--          
(--) 
1.03
           
(0.92) 
-3.54
***        
(-2.77) 
--          
(--) 
1.21
            
(0.89) 
-6.24
***        
(-3.70) 




--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
1.26
           
(0.77) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
6.23
***         
(5.49) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
9.83
***         
(7.12) 





















--          
(--) 
Net sales growth 
(lagged) 
--          
(--) 




--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.29       
(-0.89)  
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 




***    
(-5.04) 
-3.17
***    
(-4.98) 
--          
(--) 
-1.54
**    
(-2.48) 
-1.65
*    
(-1.69) 
--          
(--) 
-0.91       
(-1.34) 
-1.09       
(-0.93) 




--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-2.12
***    
(-3.78) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.63       
(-1.03) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 




**    
(-2.10) 
-0.84
*       
(-1.83) 
-0.45
       
(-1.03) 
-0.78
***    
(-2.94) 
-0.75
***      
(-3.20) 
-0.63
**    
(-2.57) 
-0.34
       
(-1.21) 
-0.72
***     
(-3.05) 
-1.00




**       
(-2.46) 
-0.91
*       
(-1.89) 
-0.64      
(-1.45) 
-1.01
***   
(-3.78) 
-0.92
***   
(-4.01) 
-0.81
***     
(-3.47) 
-0.53
*       
(-1.87) 
-0.91
***   
(-3.92) 
-1.19




       
(-1.38) 
-0.42
       
(-0.97) 
-0.33
       
(-0.77) 
-0.48
*       
(-1.82) 
-0.44
*      
(-1.94) 
-0.39
*      
(-1.69) 
0.02  
    
(0.06) 
-0.43
*    
(-1.90) 
-0.65
***    
(-2.68) 
2000 
-0.19       
(-0.43) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.07       
(-0.29) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.28     
(1.04) 
--          
(--) 
































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 











-- -- --  390.79
*** 287.66
*** 283.84
*** --  --  -- 
R
2 (overall)  0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.33 0.31 0.08 
Breusch-Pagan 
statistic (RE) 
-- -- --  1148.52
*** 835.38
*** 812.05
*** --  --  -- 
F statistic           
(FE) 





tic (RE, FE) 
-- -- --  14.04  9.46  20.61






















1330 1064 1064 1330 1064 1064 1330 1064 1064 
Note: 
* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero or that the underlying null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, respectively.      32
Table 5: Parameter estimates (z statistics) in different panel data models, dependent variable: 
Tobin’s Q, N = 266 corporations 
  Pooled regression models  Random effects (RE) models  Fixed effects (FE) models 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4’)  (5’)  (6’)  (4’’)  (5’’)  (6’’) 
DJSI World 
0.17
**      
(2.41) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.02        
(0.29) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.05       
(-0.66) 
--          
(--) 


















--          
(--) 
-0.01       
(-0.10) 
-0.00       
(-0.04) 
Log total assets  
-0.37
***        
(-8.37) 
-0.31
***     
(-7.18) 
--          
(--) 
-0.49
***     
(-9.44) 
-0.31
***     
(-6.64) 
--          
(--) 
-1.17
***     
(-10.22) 
-0.48
***     
(-3.49) 
--          
(--) 
Log total assets 
(lagged) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.32
***     
(-7.56) 
--          
(--) 





--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.46




        
(1.48) 
0.48        
(1.63) 
--          
(--) 
0.83
***      
(2.89) 
0.14        
(0.50) 
--          
(--) 
1.12
***      
(3.06) 
-0.23       
(-0.57) 




--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.42
*       
(1.68) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.25     
(1.00) 
--          
(--) 









--          
(--) 




--          
(--) 
0.07        
(1.12) 
0.03        
(0.52) 
--          
(--) 
Net sales growth 
(lagged) 
--          
(--) 





--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.09   
(1.12) 
--          
(--) 







***     
(-4.13) 
-0.51
***     
(-4.27) 
--          
(--) 
-0.23       
(-1.40) 
-0.21      
(-0.98) 
--          
(--) 
-0.02       
(-0.10) 
0.05        
(0.18) 




--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.35
***     
(-3.74) 
--          
(--) 




--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 







***      
(-4.19) 
-0.33
***     
(-3.45) 
-0.57









***     
(-5.29) 
-0.40
***     
(-7.06) 
-0.29







***     
(-4.28) 
-0.37
***     
(-3.84) 
-0.60






***     
(-6.67) 
-0.41
***     
(-5.31) 
-0.43










*      
(-1.86) 
-0.19
*     
(-1.80) 
-0.35
***     
(-5.03) 
-0.20
***     
(-3.75) 
-0.17
***     
(-3.15) 
-0.15
**      
(-1.97) 
-0.19
***     
(-3.42) 
-0.14
**     
(-2.40) 
2000 
-0.20       
(-1.39) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.17
**      
(-2.38) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.02       
(-0.26) 
--          
(--) 













***     
(13.25) 
10.98
***     
(10.26) 
11.29
***     
(11.06) 
28.76
***     
(10.74) 
12.78







Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 











-- -- --  406.43
*** 290.64
*** 304.81
*** --  --  -- 
R
2 (overall)  0.38 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.18 0.20 0.21 
Breusch-Pagan 
statistic (RE) 
-- -- --  877.88
*** 644.50
*** 637.00
*** --  --  -- 
F statistic           
(FE) 





tic (RE, FE) 
-- -- --  49.79
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Note: 
* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero or that the underlying null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, respectively.      33
Table 6: Parameter estimates (z statistics) in different panel data models, dependent variable: 
Log Tobin’s Q, N = 266 corporations 
  Pooled regression models  Random effects (RE) models  Fixed effects (FE) models 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4’) (5’)  (6’)  (4’’)  (5’’)  (6’’) 
DJSI World 
0.16
***      
(4.67) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.02        
(0.95) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.01        
(0.31) 
--          
(--) 
























Log total assets  
-0.24
***        
(-17.98) 
-0.23
***     
(-15.58) 
--          
(--) 
-0.22
***     
(-10.71) 
-0.17
***     
(-7.36) 
--          
(--) 
-0.23
***     
(-6.52) 
-0.02       
(-0.45) 
--          
(--) 
Log total assets 
(lagged) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.23
***     
(-16.19) 
--          
(--) 





--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.13




***        
(10.10) 
1.16
***      
(9.12) 
--          
(--) 
0.75
***      
(7.59) 
0.57
***      
(4.93) 
--          
(--) 
0.62
***      
(5.53) 
0.27
*     
(1.92) 




--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
1.09
***      
(8.90) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.50
***     
(5.01) 
--          
(--) 










--          
(--) 




--          
(--) 
0.01        
(0.44) 
-0.00       
(-0.05) 




--          
(--) 





--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
0.08
***   
(2.90) 
--          
(--) 







***     
(-3.22) 
-0.12
**      
(-2.57) 
--          
(--) 
-0.05       
(-1.03) 
0.03      
(0.30) 
--          
(--) 
-0.05       
(-0.91) 
-0.01       
(-0.09) 




--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.09
**     
(-2.35) 
--          
(--) 




--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 







***      
(-5.25) 
-0.17
***     
(-3.95) 
-0.28
***     
(-12.63) 
-0.23






***     
(-11.72) 
-0.23
***     
(-11.85) 
-0.19







***     
(-5.68) 
-0.23
***     
(-5.07) 
-0.32
***     
(-14.60) 
-0.27
***    
(-14.25) 
-0.23
***     
(-11.67) 
-0.32
***     
(-13.46) 
-0.28










**      
(-1.99) 
-0.09
**     
(-2.13) 
-0.14
***     
(-6.47) 
-0.09
***     
(-4.99) 
-0.08
***     
(-4.13) 
-0.14
***     
(-5.82) 
-0.10
***     
(-5.55) 
-0.09
***     
(-4.33) 
2000 
-0.06       
(-1.20) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.05
**      
(-2.38) 
--          
(--) 
--          
(--) 
-0.05
**      
(-2.13) 
--          
(--) 













***      
(12.44) 
4.67
***      
(8.87) 
5.17
***      
(10.72) 
5.30
***      
(6.44) 







Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 











-- -- --  896.23
*** 625.79
*** 687.58
*** --  --  -- 
R
2 (overall)  0.59 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.41 0.11 0.40 
Breusch-Pagan 
statistic (RE) 
-- -- --  1572.55
*** 1021.54
*** 992.85
*** --  --  -- 
F statistic           
(FE) 





tic (RE, FE) 
-- -- --  [-17.91]  33.36
*** 20.55
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* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero or that the underlying null hypothesis is 
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